While many perceive the fall of the Assad regime in Syria as a setback for Russia and Iran and a victory for the USA, Israel, and the West, the reality may be far more calculated. Beneath the chaos, a potential secret pact between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin could be reshaping the Middle East’s balance of power—a shift that may have eluded the entire Western intelligence community and media.
Recent developments, including Assad’s sudden departure, his acceptance of asylum in Russia, the rapid rebel advances, and Russia’s reluctance to intervene—initially interpreted as a sign of military overstretch due to the war in Ukraine—may actually suggest a behind-the-scenes agreement.
Erdogan-Putin Communications: The Strategic Phone Call That Changed Everything
On December 3, 2024, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a crucial phone call that many dismissed as a routine diplomatic exchange. However, in hindsight, this call appears to have been a decisive moment in shaping Syria’s future. While official statements from Ankara and Moscow framed the call as an effort to “de-escalate tensions” and “seek diplomatic solutions,” the timing and outcomes that followed suggest a more covert agenda.
On December 4, 2024, following the rapid fall of Aleppo to rebel forces, intense clashes erupted in Hama Governorate as the Syrian army attempted to halt the insurgents’ advance toward the strategic city of Hama. Despite launching a counteroffensive with air support, government forces were unable to repel the rebel factions, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The rebels captured Hama on December 5, leading to significant displacement and casualties.
This swift progression of rebel forces continued, with Homs falling on December 6, and by December 7, they had reached the outskirts of Damascus. The rapid succession of these events culminated in President Bashar al-Assad fleeing the capital on December 8, effectively ending over five decades of Assad family rule in Syria.
Russia’s Retreat?
Western analysts rushed to label Russia’s partial withdrawal of military personnel as a sign of retreat, but evidence suggests otherwise. Satellite images of troop movements and the dismantling of equipment from bases like Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base were misread as signs of a Russian exit. In reality, these moves were part of a pre-agreed realignment, not a retreat. Key Russian assets, including advanced air-defense systems like S-400s, were redeployed to reinforce Russian-backed forces in Libya, while core military bases in Syria remain operational under new agreements with the post-Assad authorities.
Rather than signaling Russian weakness, these actions reflect a broader geopolitical play, likely agreed upon with Turkey from the outset. The “withdrawal” narrative serves as a convenient smokescreen, enabling Russia to reconfigure its military presence while maintaining influence over Syria’s future. It also obscures any potential association between Moscow and the new leadership in Damascus that could hinder Western powers from lifting sanctions on Syria. Reportedly, Putin’s negotiations with the new Damascus leadership have secured Russia’s military foothold, allowing Moscow to retain control over strategic bases critical for projecting power in the Eastern Mediterranean.
This agreement appears aimed at stabilizing the region under a new geopolitical framework—one that no one had anticipated. This framework hints at a deeper alignment of interests between Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the Arab world within the BRICS framework. By restructuring their presence and influence, Russia and Turkey are not retreating but repositioning themselves at the center of a new Middle Eastern order. This potential shift could mark the beginning of a more multipolar balance of power, challenging traditional Western dominance in the region and heralding a new era of influence.
Is this the dawn of a new Middle Eastern order?
The complex situation in Syria, with multiple belligerent groups vying for control, mirrors the intricacies of international geopolitics. It’s not a simple case of “good vs. evil” or “West vs. East,” as some Western media might portray. Such simplistic narratives can obscure the realities on the ground. The truth is more nuanced: various players, various interests, and a truly multipolar moment. This is a world where no single power holds complete sway, a reality the West may be unprepared to face.
How Did the Trouble in Syria Even Start?
All started with a—drought. From 2007 to 2010, Syria experienced its worst drought in modern history, devastating agriculture, particularly in the rural northeastern regions. This environmental crisis forced an estimated 1.5 million rural Syrians to migrate to urban areas like Damascus, Hama, and Aleppo in search of jobs and better living conditions.
This mass migration overwhelmed Syria’s cities, leading to increased unemployment, poverty, and social tension. Many of these displaced rural communities, primarily Sunni Muslims, found themselves at odds with the wealthier urban elite, who were often Alawite (a Shia-related religious and ethnic minority who make up 11-15% of Syrian population) or regime-aligned Sunnis. The government’s failure to effectively address the drought and its consequences exposed deeper grievances, including:
- Economic liberalization gone wrong: In the 2000s, President Bashar al-Assad implemented partial economic reforms promoting privatization and market liberalization. However, these reforms primarily benefited a small elite class of oligarchs connected to the regime, while ordinary Syrians, especially farmers and rural communities, were left behind. Rather than producing broad-based growth, the reforms deepened wealth inequality, allowing regime insiders to grow richer while rural communities were driven further into poverty and social exclusion.
- Failure to support rural communities: The government’s lack of financial support for struggling farmers exacerbated the effects of the drought. Instead of providing drought relief or rural subsidies, the state focused on propping up its business allies and maintaining Alawite political dominance, leaving Sunni farmers, who were most affected by the drought, without state support. The result was a growing perception that the regime did not care for the rural poor, which fueled resentment and dissatisfaction
- Alawite dominance and Sunni grievances: The displacement of mostly Sunni rural communities into cities with large Sunni majorities fueled a growing sense of sectarian division. Rural Sunni migrants were already frustrated with a regime led by the Alawite minority who were seen as privileged beneficiaries of the regime’s protection. This divide sharpened the sense of “us vs. them”. When unemployment skyrocketed in urban centers, displaced Sunni populations blamed the regime for their suffering, further escalating tensions.
The Role of the Arab Spring
While the drought was a significant trigger, it was not the sole cause of Syria’s crisis. As the Arab Spring swept across the Middle East in 2011, it brought down long-standing regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, inspiring similar protests in Syria. Citizens demanded political reforms, greater civil liberties, and an end to government corruption. But unlike Tunisia or Egypt, where regime change was swift, Assad’s government responded with brutal repression, using military force to quell demonstrations.
The result was radicalization. Disillusioned Sunni rural migrants joined the protests en masse, driven not just by demands for political reform but also by grievances rooted in their economic and social exclusion. What could have remained a limited reformist movement instead escalated into a full-blown armed insurgency, as repression turned protests into resistance. Groups like the Free Syrian Army (FSA) emerged from this rebellion, but many later splintered into more radical factions, such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which translates to “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant,” and was formerly known as the al-Nusra Front. Supported primarily by Turkey, HTS became a principal force in the recent overthrow of Assad’s regime.
The Perfect Storm: Climate, Economic, and Political Failures
This convergence of climate, economic, and political failures produced the conditions for a protracted war. The collapse of the rural economy caused by drought displaced millions, the failure of Assad’s government to provide economic support deepened the grievances, and the wider context of the Arab Spring uprisings added ideological momentum. Together, these forces triggered an unprecedented social collapse.
As expected, regional and global powers intervened. What began as a civil uprising transformed into a geopolitical battleground involving Turkey, Russia, the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Each of these powers pursued their own agenda, competing for control over energy resources, strategic trade routes, and military dominance in one of the most geopolitically significant regions in the world. The battle for Syria became a “proxy war” fought by local factions but controlled by international powers with far-reaching agendas.
To understand the development of the conflict, it is essential to explore the role of each of these powers, the resources at stake, and the strategic goals each one pursued.
Netanyahu’s 1996 Strategy and U.S. Policy Alignment: Leveraging Syria’s Crisis to Reshape the Middle East
In 1996, a policy document titled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm” was prepared by a study group led by Richard Perle for then-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The report advocated for a new approach to ensuring Israel’s security, emphasizing the removal of regional adversaries and the containment of threats through proactive measures. It specifically recommended efforts to weaken or topple regimes in countries such as Iraq and Syria, which were perceived as threats to Israel’s security.
This strategic vision found resonance in U.S. foreign policy, particularly after the events of September 11, 2001. General Wesley Clark, a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, revealed that the U.S. had devised a plan to “attack seven Muslim states” in a five-year period following 9/11, including Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, Iran, and Syria. This plan aimed to reshape the Middle East in a manner that would neutralize perceived threats to both U.S. and Israeli interests, reduce Russian influence, and open the region for U.S. control of energy politics, trade routes, and military dominance.
To achieve this, the U.S. and its allies employed a multi-pronged approach that went far beyond rhetoric about democracy and human rights. While Western media framed the intervention as support for “pro-democracy movements,” the reality was far more calculated. The logic was not to “promote democracy” but to use the crisis to dismantle Assad’s power, weaken Iranian influence, and isolate Hezbollah.
This approach mirrored earlier strategies used in Iraq (2003), Libya (2011), and Egypt (2011), where U.S.-backed opposition forces, often comprised of radical Islamists, were framed as “freedom fighters” by Western media. In each of these cases, however, the removal of a stable, albeit autocratic, regime created a power vacuum that jihadist groups, warlords, and foreign actors quickly exploited. The goal was never democracy—it was division and thereby control.
Exploiting Syria’s Vulnerabilities
The onset of the Arab Spring in 2011, combined with Syria’s internal challenges like the severe drought and economic mismanagement, created the perfect storm for unrest. The sudden convergence of environmental, social, and economic crises provided fertile ground for dissent. The U.S. and its allies saw this as a strategic opportunity. With Syria already reeling from internal pressures, it became easier to destabilize the Assad regime through support for opposition forces, sanctions, and covert operations.
To achieve this, the U.S. pursued a multi-layered strategy that involved backing rebel factions, leveraging the media to shape public opinion, and using international organizations to legitimize sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Here’s how this strategy played out:
- Weaponizing Opposition Groups
The U.S. provided support to opposition forces, including the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and later groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which were often presented as “rebels” in Western media but had strong connections to al-Qaeda-linked factions. By legitimizing these groups and branding them as “moderate rebels,” the U.S. justified its financial, logistical, and military support for them. This support was channeled through intermediaries like Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, allowing the U.S. to maintain plausible deniability while directly aiding jihadist groups. - Economic Sanctions and International Isolation
The U.S. imposed a series of crippling economic sanctions on Syria, including the notorious Caesar Act, which came into effect in 2020. These sanctions targeted Syrian industries, banking systems, and key individuals associated with Assad’s regime. By isolating Syria economically, the U.S. aimed to deprive the government of revenue while punishing Syrian civilians as a way to foster dissent and increase social pressure against Assad. This approach has been criticized as a form of “collective punishment” since the sanctions made it harder for ordinary Syrians to access medicine, food, and critical infrastructure. - Media Narratives and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)
Control of the narrative was crucial. Western media framed the conflict in stark “good vs. evil” terms, portraying Assad as a “butcher of his own people” and promoting opposition forces as “freedom fighters” seeking democratic change. This narrative distorted reality, hiding the role of jihadist groups like HTS and ISIS within the opposition and whitewashing their crimes. Media outlets like CNN, BBC, and The Guardian played a central role in amplifying this narrative, often quoting “Syrian activists” who were linked to organizations like the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), which was run from London by a single man with questionable sources on the ground. - Intelligence and Covert Operations
The U.S. CIA’s Timber Sycamore program, launched in 2012, was one of the most significant covert efforts to train and arm opposition forces in Syria. CIA operatives worked with Turkey, Jordan, and other Gulf states to supply weapons and intelligence to Syrian rebel factions. The program funneled billions of dollars worth of weapons, including TOW anti-tank missiles, into the hands of groups that sometimes later aligned with or merged into jihadist factions like HTS. - Targeting Assad’s Key Allies (Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia)
The U.S. aimed to isolate Syria from its key allies — Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia — by applying diplomatic and military pressure on all fronts. Syria has always been a crucial bridge for Iran to transfer weapons and funds to Hezbollah in Lebanon. By weakening Syria, the U.S. aimed to cut off this supply line and weaken Hezbollah, which is one of Israel’s most potent regional adversaries. Simultaneously, by attacking Russia’s allies, the U.S. intended to block Russian influence in the region. But unlike the U.S., Russia refused to abandon its core interests. Instead of pulling out, Russia doubled down by intervening militarily in 2015, changing the balance of power in Assad’s favor.
What Were the U.S.’s Real Objectives?
While the official rhetoric of the U.S. government focused on promoting democracy and protecting human rights, its real objectives were far more geopolitical and strategic. Here’s a breakdown of the core goals:
- Weaken Iran’s Regional Influence
Syria has been a key ally of Iran. By removing Assad, the U.S. aimed to disrupt the “Shia Crescent” — the alliance between Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Hezbollah — which posed a direct threat to Israel’s security and American control of the Middle East. - Enhance Israel’s Security
Since the 1996 “A Clean Break” strategy, Israeli policymakers viewed Syria as a “threat” to Israeli dominance in the region. By weakening or removing Assad, Israel could create a buffer zone to neutralize Hezbollah’s access to Syria. Assad was one of Israel’s fiercest critics, providing logistical and military support to Palestinian resistance movements like Hamas. - Control Energy Routes
Syria’s strategic location lies at the heart of the proposed Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline This pipeline would transport Qatari natural gas to Europe, bypassing Russia, and reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. - Promote Regime Change
The U.S. had no problem supporting radical Islamist groups to achieve this, as seen in Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan. The same logic that fueled U.S. support for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan later created the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
What Were Russia’s Real Objectives?
For a long time after the fall of the Soviet Union, up to 2014, Russia was primarily absent from active foreign policy and military intervention. This changed with two pivotal events: NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya and the CIA-backed 2014 Maidan coup in Ukraine.
While Russia claimed its 2015 intervention in Syria was aimed at “fighting terrorism” and promoting “regional stability”, its true objectives were far more strategic and geopolitical. Russia views the Syrian conflict as an opportunity to challenge U.S. global dominance. The Syrian war allows Russia to portray itself as a defender of allies (like Iran and Assad) and a reliable powerbroker in regions where the U.S. has historically called the shots.
The turning point when Russia returned to the world stage came in 2011 with NATO’s intervention in Libya, which Russia saw as a betrayal of trust. After abstaining from a UN vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized a no-fly zone in Libya, Russia believed it was supporting a limited “humanitarian mission.” However, NATO overstepped its mandate by launching a full-scale military intervention that ultimately overthrew Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. This event profoundly shaped Russian President Vladimir Putin’s worldview, cementing his belief that the West uses “humanitarian intervention” as a cover for regime change.
Determined to avoid another “Libya scenario”, Russia adopted a hardline stance in Syria. In 2015, Russia intervened militarily to prevent regime change and to send a clear message that the West would no longer be able to use humanitarian justifications as a pretext for intervention. Russian airstrikes played a decisive role in stabilizing Assad’s regime, crushing U.S.-backed opposition forces, and reclaiming key cities like Aleppo.
Unlike the U.S., which has a record of “losing wars” in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam, Russia managed to stabilize Assad’s regime and maintain control over Syria’s key assets, including its naval base in Tartus and airbase in Khmeimim. By doing so, Russia reinforces its global reputation as a power that can successfully challenge Western interventionism.
This moment also marked a broader shift in Russia’s global strategy. From that point onward, Russia adopted a more proactive, interventionist approach in global affairs, as seen in its later involvement in Crimea (2014) and Donbas (2014-2022). No longer a passive observer, Russia positioned itself as a force that could defy U.S. regime change plots and protect its allies from Western intervention.
By framing its intervention in Syria as a stand against “Western imperialism”, Russia was able to position itself as a global defender of sovereignty. This approach played well in the Global South, where many nations had grown weary of U.S. interventionism. Russia’s ability to stabilize Assad’s regime, protect its military bases, and retain influence in the Middle East became a symbol of its resurgence as a great power. This strategy highlighted Russia’s role as a global power that could defy U.S. hegemony and project independent military power far beyond its borders.
Here’s a breakdown of Russia’s core goals:
- Preserve Russian Military Bases
Russia’s primary objective was to maintain control over its naval base in Tartus and airbase at Khmeimim, which provide Russia with direct access to the Mediterranean Sea. These bases allow Russia to project military power in the Middle East, North Africa, and Southern Europe. If Assad fell, Russia risked losing its only naval facility in the Mediterranean, which would cripple its ability to counter NATO naval forces. By securing these bases, Russia retains its role as a global military power. - Oppose the Qatar-Turkey Gas Pipeline
One of Russia’s most crucial objectives was to prevent the construction of the Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline, which would compete with Russian gas exports to Europe. The pipeline, backed by the U.S. and Gulf States, aimed to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. By supporting Assad, Russia ensured that Syria would never approve the construction of the pipeline, thereby protecting its lucrative Gazprom exports to Europe. This objective is part of Russia’s larger strategy to maintain its position as Europe’s dominant energy supplier. - Maintain Assad’s Regime
Russia sees Bashar al-Assad as indispensable to its broader strategy in Syria. If Assad were removed, a U.S.-backed government or a Gulf-backed opposition could come to power, likely granting approval for the Qatar-Turkey pipeline and revoking Russia’s military base leases in Tartus and Khmeimim. By supporting Assad militarily, Russia preserves its long-term influence in Syria and prevents a U.S.-led regime from controlling Syria’s future. - Control Syria’s Post-War Reconstruction Contracts
Russia aimed to control Syria’s post-war reconstruction contracts, including lucrative deals for Russian construction, gas, and oil companies. By securing the right to rebuild Syria’s infrastructure, Russia ensured that it would have a stronghold over Syria’s economy and resources. This also created jobs for Russian firms and workers, reinforcing Russia’s domestic economy while tightening its grip on Syria’s future.Control airspace over Syria, forcing NATO and Israel to coordinate with Russia for air operations. - Control Syria’s Airspace
Russia sought to control Syria’s airspace, forcing NATO and Israel to coordinate with Russia for any air operations in the region. This objective was achieved with the deployment of S-400 missile defense systems and Russia’s control over Khmeimim Airbase. By controlling Syria’s airspace, Russia made itself the ultimate decision-maker on who can fly, where, and when. - Counter Turkish Influence
As Turkey established a “buffer zone” in northern Syria, Russia sought to counter Turkish influence by limiting the size and scope of Turkey’s occupation. Turkey had originally planned to establish a large “safe zone” in Syria to house millions of refugees and reduce Kurdish control in the area. However, Russia successfully limited the size of this buffer zone through diplomatic negotiations. By mediating ceasefires between Turkey, Assad, and Kurdish forces, Russia positioned itself as the main powerbroker. This allowed Russia to prevent Turkey from overextending its influence in Syria while also giving Russia leverage over Turkey.
What Were Turkey’s Real Objectives?
Turkey is a messy player. It doesn’t align with anybody and has no real allies nor foes. It is a NATO member but aspires to membership in BRICS. It is a Muslim country but sees itself as European. Turkey is a country between East and West, between past and future, building bridges and then burning them.
Turkey presented its intervention in Syria as a response to “terrorism” and the protection of Syrian refugees, but its real agenda was far more ambitious. Turkey’s main goal was to prevent Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria, as Ankara sees Kurdish independence as a direct threat to its own territorial integrity. Turkey’s goals also include controlling energy routes and establishing a Neo-Ottoman sphere of influence.
Here’s a breakdown of Turkey’s core goals:
- Prevent Kurdish Autonomy
Turkey’s primary objective is to prevent the creation of a Kurdish autonomous region in northern Syria. Such a region, controlled by the YPG (People’s Protection Units), would serve as a base for the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a Kurdish separatist group that has been waging an insurgency in Turkey since the 1980s. To prevent this, Turkey launched military operations like Euphrates Shield (2016), Olive Branch (2018), and Operation Peace Spring (2019) to control Syria’s northern border and establish a buffer zone. This buffer serves as a barrier between Kurdish forces and Turkish territory, while also allowing Turkey to settle displaced Syrian refugees in these “safe zones” — thereby altering the region’s demographic balance in Turkey’s favor. - Control of Trade and Energy Routes
Turkey seeks to become a regional energy hub, controlling the flow of natural gas from Qatar, Iraq, and Iran to Europe. The planned Qatar-Turkey pipeline would grant Turkey control over gas flowing into Europe, making it an indispensable player in European energy security. By backing opposition forces in Syria, Turkey ensures that any future government will support its control of this route. Control of this energy corridor would give Turkey significant leverage over Europe and increase Ankara’s importance in global energy markets, allowing it to negotiate better deals with Russia and the EU. - Support for Islamist Proxies (FSA and HTS)
Turkey has been a key backer of Syrian opposition forces like the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and later Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which has deep links to al-Qaeda. By supporting these groups, Turkey establishes a pro-Turkish presence in northern Syria, weakens Assad, and puts pressure on Kurdish militias. Turkey’s strategy is to rebrand Islamist groups like HTS as “moderate opposition” to make them more palatable to Western media and policymakers. This move grants Turkey plausible deniability while ensuring it maintains influence over the region. Turkish-backed proxies are often used as foot soldiers for Ankara’s broader military and political objectives, allowing Turkey to avoid large-scale troop deployments. - Reassert Neo-Ottoman Influence
Erdogan’s foreign policy aims to restore Turkey’s dominance in regions historically under Ottoman control, particularly Syria and Iraq. By invoking the concept of Turkey’s “natural borders,” he signals a desire to expand the country’s sphere of influence beyond its current boundaries. Securing northern Syria allows Erdogan to reclaim symbolic and strategic control over what he considers Turkey’s rightful borderlands. This foothold strengthens Turkey’s leverage over rivals like Russia, the U.S., and Iran, positioning it as a pivotal mediator and powerbroker in the Syrian conflict. Domestically, it reinforces nationalist sentiment, linking modern Turkey’s ambitions with the legacy of its imperial past, thereby bolstering Erdogan’s political standing at home.
What Were Iran’s Real Objectives?
While Iran officially claimed its involvement in Syria was to “support an ally against terrorism,” its real motives revolved around geopolitical strategy and religious influence. Iran’s top priority was to preserve the “Shia Crescent”, an unbroken corridor of Shia influence running from Tehran to Beirut, which secures Iran’s ability to supply its most powerful proxy, Hezbollah. Unlike Turkey, which shifts alliances for pragmatic reasons, or Russia, which seeks military bases and energy dominance, Iran’s involvement is driven by a mix of ideology, revenge for colonial exploitation, and a broader strategy to oppose U.S. hegemony in the Middle East.
The roots of Iran’s anti-Western stance trace back to the 1953 CIA-orchestrated coup that overthrew Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, after he nationalized Iran’s oil. This coup reinstalled the Shah, a Western-aligned autocrat, leading to decades of resentment toward the U.S. and Britain. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 was, in many ways, Iran’s revenge against Western dominance. Since then, Iran has sought to dismantle the U.S.-led global order and regain full sovereignty. The war in Syria provided Iran with an opportunity to cement its role as a leading regional power, protect its Shia allies, and project power far beyond its borders.
Here’s a breakdown of Iran’s core goals:
- Maintain the Shia Crescent
Iran aims to secure a corridor of Shia-controlled territories stretching from Iran, through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. This corridor enables Iran to supply Hezbollah with weapons, money, and support, ensuring Iran’s influence extends to Israel’s doorstep. Without Syria, Iran’s route to Lebanon would be severed, forcing it to rely on slower and riskier sea or air routes that could be intercepted by Israel or the U.S. By supporting Assad, Iran guarantees the integrity of this route and preserves its role as a regional power. - Support Hezbollah
Hezbollah is Iran’s most powerful proxy, and its survival depends on a stable supply line through Syria. If Assad’s regime fell, Hezbollah would be cut off from Iranian weapons and funds. Without Syria as a conduit, Hezbollah would face logistical isolation, weakening its ability to confront Israel. By propping up Assad, Iran maintains its “land bridge” to Lebanon, giving Hezbollah access to precision-guided missiles, drones, and advanced weaponry. This allows Iran to pressure Israel and retaliate if Iran is attacked. - Control Energy Routes (Pipeline Competition)
Iran seeks to block the proposed Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline, which would reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian and Iranian gas. Iran supports the rival Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline, which would transport Iranian gas to Europe. If Assad were overthrown, the Qatar-Turkey route would likely be approved, undercutting Iran’s role in the European gas market. By ensuring Assad’s survival, Iran keeps the Iran-backed pipeline on the table while blocking its Qatari competitor. - Undermine U.S. and Israeli Influence
By supporting Assad, Iran prevents U.S.-backed opposition groups from seizing power in Syria. This weakens U.S. influence in the region and blocks U.S. control over Syria’s oil and gas resources. Moreover, by stationing Shia militias and Hezbollah in Syria, Iran increases its leverage over Israel. With military positions near the Golan Heights, Iran can threaten Israel directly, creating a deterrent against future Israeli strikes on Iranian soil. - Revenge Against Western Imperialism
Iran’s intervention in Syria is also motivated by a desire for revenge against Western imperialism. Since the 1953 coup that ousted Mossadegh, Iran has sought to weaken U.S. influence in the Middle East. By defending Assad, Iran prevents another Western-backed regime change, which it sees as a “1953 scenario.” For Iran, every success in Syria is another symbolic victory over Western colonial powers and a rejection of their historical exploitation of the Middle East. - Expand Regional Hegemony
Iran’s larger ambition is to become the dominant power in the Middle East. While Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) back Sunni forces in Syria, Iran aims to establish a Shia power bloc. By supporting Shia militias in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, Iran builds a “shadow army” capable of exerting influence across the region. Securing Syria strengthens Iran’s influence in the Levant and the eastern Mediterranean, extending its reach into Europe’s periphery.
What Were the Gulf States’ Real Objectives (Saudi Arabia and Qatar)?
The Gulf States — particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar — viewed Syria as an opportunity to counter Iranian influence while controlling the flow of natural gas to Europe. Unlike Turkey, which aimed to contain Kurdish autonomy, and Russia, which prioritized military bases, Saudi Arabia and Qatar focused on regime change. Their motives were driven by profit, ideology, and energy dominance. Stoning women while rocket launching, preaching modesty while flaunting harems, and building glassy skyscrapers with slave labor—these feudal states in a space age combine medieval law with futuristic wealth. Their alliance with the U.S. is one of convenience, driven by the shared objective of controlling oil, gas, and geopolitics in the Middle East.
Here’s a breakdown of their core goals:
- Control Energy Corridors
The Gulf States’ top priority is to build the Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline, which would export Qatari gas directly to Europe. This pipeline would bypass Russia, and offer a piece of cake to Saudis. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have both pushed for Assad’s removal to make way for a pro-Gulf government that would approve the pipeline’s construction. By controlling energy corridors, Qatar and Saudi Arabia would establish themselves as indispensable energy suppliers to Europe, boosting their economic and geopolitical clout. - Promote Sunni Hegemony
Saudi Arabia and Qatar seek to install a Sunni-controlled government in Syria. Assad, a member of the Alawite minority (a Shia offshoot), has long been aligned with Iran and Hezbollah, both of whom are Shia powers. Toppling Assad would weaken Iran’s influence in Syria and disrupt the so-called “Shia Crescent” that stretches from Tehran to Beirut. By replacing Assad with a Sunni-led government, Saudi Arabia and Qatar aim to consolidate Sunni dominance in the region, strengthen the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and secure a foothold in Syria’s future political order. - Weaken Iranian and Hezbollah Influence
The Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, see Iran and Hezbollah as existential threats. Both countries have been locked in a proxy war for dominance in the Middle East, with battles playing out in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. By ousting Assad, the Gulf States could cut off Hezbollah’s supply routes from Iran, leaving the group vulnerable in Lebanon. This would reduce Hezbollah’s ability to strike Israel and curtail Iranian influence in the Levant. The removal of Assad would be a strategic win for Saudi Arabia’s broader effort to isolate Iran diplomatically, militarily, and economically. - Expand Wahhabi Influence
Saudi Arabia’s regional strategy includes the export of Wahhabism, a conservative form of Sunni Islam that it has spread throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. By supporting anti-Assad Islamist forces, including groups with ties to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other militant Islamist factions, Saudi Arabia promotes an ideological shift in Syria’s society. The goal is to ensure that any new regime aligns with Wahhabi ideology, thereby expanding Saudi Arabia’s cultural and ideological influence in the region. - Maintain the Gulf States’ Role as U.S. Allies
Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s intervention in Syria aligns with U.S. foreign policy objectives. By supporting opposition groups and funding Sunni militias, the Gulf States ensure that they remain essential U.S. allies in the Middle East. Their support for regime change and “democracy promotion” serves as a public relations tool to justify their intervention. This relationship allows Saudi Arabia and Qatar to maintain access to U.S. military support, weapons contracts, and diplomatic backing.
Conversion of Interests: The Battle for Syria is a Struggle for Power, Not Principles
The Syrian conflict is often framed as a battle for “democracy” and “human rights,” but this narrative collapses under scrutiny. At its core, Syria is the battleground for energy routes, military dominance, and regional influence, driven by the ambitions of several competing powers. While each player frames its intervention as a humanitarian mission or a fight against terrorism, their true motives are far more calculated.
- The U.S. pursues energy dominance, regime change, and geopolitical control, seeking to cut off Iran’s Shia Crescent while ensuring Europe remains dependent on U.S.-controlled energy routes.
- Russia defies U.S. hegemony, protecting its military bases and securing its energy monopoly over Europe by blocking the Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline.
- Turkey seeks to prevent Kurdish autonomy, control energy routes, and revive its Neo-Ottoman sphere of influence. It plays both sides, maintaining NATO membership while courting BRICS.
- Iran aims to maintain the Shia Crescent, keep Hezbollah supplied, and prevent the rise of Sunni-backed regimes that would cut off its supply routes to Lebanon.
- Saudi Arabia and Qatar seek to replace Assad with a Sunni-aligned regime that would approve the Qatar-Turkey pipeline while reducing Iranian influence in Syria. Their motives are driven by the promise of profit, religious hegemony, and an ideological battle against Shia Islam.
These overlapping objectives highlight that the Syrian war is not a simple “East vs. West” clash, nor is it about “good vs. evil.” It is a classic power struggle among empires and regional powers, each vying for control of the same chessboard. The rhetoric of “democracy” or “freedom” serves as a useful cover story for Western audiences, but behind closed doors, the driving forces are money, oil, gas, and geopolitical leverage.
The players may change their tactics, but the strategy remains the same: Control Syria, and you control the heart of the Middle East. Whoever wins Syria controls not only the region’s energy routes but also its ideological and military future. In this battle, no side is innocent, and no action is purely altruistic. Every interventionist — from the U.S. and Russia to Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf States — pursues its own self-interest, often at the expense of the Syrian people.
Erdogan and Assad: From Allies to Enemies
At one point, Erdogan and Assad were allies. In 2008, Erdogan even hosted Assad and his wife for a family holiday. But their relationship collapsed when Assad refused to implement reforms in response to protests during the Arab Spring. Erdogan publicly criticized Assad’s harsh repression of protesters and soon began supporting the Free Syrian Army (FSA), an armed opposition group.
But the deeper reason is ideological. Erdogan is an Islamist who backs Sunni Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. In contrast, Assad’s regime is Ba’athist and secular, relying on support from the Alawite minority, a Shia offshoot. Erdogan saw Assad as an obstacle to his own neo-Ottoman vision of Turkey as a regional power controlling northern Syria and the eastern Mediterranean.
The Role of Turkey and HTS (The “Rebranded” Jihadists)
Turkey’s role in the collapse of Assad’s regime is undeniable. For years, Turkey has backed Syrian opposition forces, but its strategy in 2024 was different. This time, Turkey fully committed, providing support for the rebranded Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group with deep ties to al-Qaeda. Some Western media outlets have attempted to sanitize HTS, referring to them as “rebels” instead of recognizing them as jihadists in suits. Turkey’s strategy is clear: rebrand the group to make it more palatable to Western audiences, enabling greater legitimacy for their control of Syria.
HTS is not a “rebel force” in the traditional sense. It’s a radical Islamist faction that received training and support from Turkey, Israel, and the United States. Erdogan enabled them to become the de facto rulers of Syria, which was essential to Turkey’s larger strategy of securing control over northern Syria and establishing itself as a dominant regional power. By supporting HTS, Erdogan created a tool to oust Assad while preserving Turkish influence.
A critical aspect of this strategy was Turkey’s exploitation of the severe financial strain on Assad’s forces. With Syrian soldiers reportedly being paid as little as $7 per month, their loyalty to the regime was fragile. Turkey and HTS capitalized on this vulnerability by offering soldiers $400 each to lay down their weapons and surrender without a fight. For soldiers struggling to survive on meager wages, this offer was too tempting to refuse. The result was a cascade of defections that accelerated the collapse of Assad’s defensive lines in key cities like Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and eventually Damascus.
This financial strategy, combined with Turkey’s logistical, financial, and operational support for HTS, proved decisive. By weakening Assad’s military from within and bolstering the capabilities of opposition forces, Turkey positioned itself as a pivotal actor in the outcome of Syria’s civil war. It wasn’t just guns and bombs that toppled Assad’s regime — it was also dollars and desperation.
Qatar-Turkey Gas Pipeline: A New Dependency for Europe
The notion that the Qatar-Turkey pipeline will “liberate” Europe from Russian gas dependency is misleading at best. It simply replaces one dependency with another, granting Turkey enormous geopolitical leverage over European energy security. This shift doesn’t reduce Europe’s vulnerability — it just changes the player holding the valve.
Le Monde’s analysis of the Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline is naive at best, and deceitful at worst. The French newspaper portrayed it as a project that “bypasses Russia” and “saves Europe from energy dependence.” However, the reality is that the pipeline is not a tool of liberation—it’s a new mechanism of control.
With Turkey as the gatekeeper, the country would hold control over Europe’s energy supply. Turkey, not Qatar, would have its hands on the valve. This would grant Turkey significant leverage over European energy security, making Ankara an indispensable energy partner for Europe. Given Turkey’s history of using geopolitical pressure for political concessions, this control is not without risks. Turkey’s assertive and independent foreign policy means that it does not align with any particular bloc, and Ankara has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to use energy as a political bargaining tool.
The promise of “independence” from Russian gas is also an illusion. While Europe may reduce its reliance on Gazprom, it would shift its dependency to Turkey — a country that has consistently pursued an independent and assertive foreign policy. Even if the route bypasses territories like Serbia or Hungary, it ultimately centralizes control in Turkey’s hands. In any future political dispute, Turkey could leverage its control over the flow of gas to pressure European decision-making.
By relying on the Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline, Europe is not gaining independence — it is trading one dependency for another.
Why Did Assad’s Regime Fall So Fast?
The sudden collapse of Assad’s regime in 2024 left many analysts stunned. Unlike previous battles for Aleppo, Homs, and Hama — where Assad’s forces fiercely resisted — the 2024 offensive by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Turkish-backed rebels faced little resistance. So, why did Assad’s forces collapse this time?
Low Soldier Morale and Compensation
Syrian army personnel were significantly underpaid and demoralized. Reports indicate that enlisted soldiers earned approximately $10 per month, while officers received about $30. In a last-ditch effort to boost morale, Assad decreed a 50% salary increase for active-duty soldiers on December 4, 2024. However, this raise was insufficient to address the systemic issues within the military.
Hezbollah’s Withdrawal
Hezbollah, a crucial ally providing military support to Assad, withdrew a significant number of its fighters from Syria to address escalating tensions in Lebanon. This withdrawal left Syrian government forces without essential support, contributing to their inability to repel advancing rebel groups.
As key cities like Aleppo, Homs, and Hama fell in quick succession, Assad’s inner circle likely panicked. Reports surfaced of Syrian soldiers and commanders deserting, while some regime officials fled the country. Government forces resorted to looting as regime control unraveled. The collapse was not a result of one decisive battle but a chain reaction of internal disintegration.
This combination of low morale, the withdrawal of Hezbollah, and the regime’s loss of command and control created the perfect storm. Unlike earlier conflicts, where Assad relied on Russia and Iran for support, this time the regime was left exposed, with its core supporters and foreign allies either unable or unwilling to intervene decisively.
Conclusion: A New Geopolitical Reality
As the dust settles in Syria, one truth emerges: this was never about democracy, freedom, or human rights. It was a battle for power, energy routes, and military dominance. Each key player — the U.S., Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar — pursued its own agenda, using Syria as the chessboard for their ambitions. The result is not the triumph of one side over the other but the establishment of a multipolar world where no single power controls the board.
For centuries, geopolitics revolved around a binary “East vs. West” paradigm. That era is over. Syria shows that the future belongs to a system of competing powers balancing one another. Erdogan, Putin, Khamenei, and Netanyahu each played their roles to perfection. Erdogan secured dominance over northern Syria, Putin retained Russia’s military bases, and Iran preserved its Shia Crescent. Meanwhile, the U.S., Turkey, and Israel continue to bomb various targets in Syria, each with its own agenda.
But while Russia, Turkey, and Iran have achieved their objectives, Europe achieved nothing. Once the center of global power, Europe is now reduced to a pawn on the chessboard. In its attempt to “liberate” itself from Russian energy dependency, Europe became entangled in new dependencies on Turkey, Qatar, and even Hungary, Serbia, or Romania. The irony is inescapable. For centuries, Turkey was Europe’s greatest threat. The Ottoman Empire toppled Byzantium, invaded the Balkans, and stood at the gates of Vienna twice. It was Croatians, Hungarians, Polish, and Russians who stopped them. And yet, in 2024, this same Turkey is viewed as a “better partner” than Christian Russia. The very empire Europe fought to contain for centuries is now its “savior” from Russian gas dependency.
The justification for this shift often rests on the tired binary of “democracy vs. autocracy.” But this is a false dichotomy. Democracy cannot be found in Turkey, Russia, or even in the EU and USA. Instead, we have corporate oligarchies in the West and nationalist presidencies in Turkey and Russia. Anyone who believes that Europe’s energy decisions are driven by “supporting democracy” is deluding themselves.
The Syrian conflict also forces us to confront a deeper philosophical question: Is imperialism the natural behavior of strong powers? History suggests it is. From ancient Rome to Britain, France, the U.S., and now Russia and China, every rising power has followed the same logic: “Might makes right.” As a power grows stronger, it projects itself outward. This cycle has repeated itself with every empire throughout history.
For most of the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia was too weak to play this game. It watched NATO expand eastward, U.S. forces march into Iraq and Afghanistan, and its former Soviet republics become U.S. allies. Critics argue that Russia became imperialistic only after it regained strength, with Syria, Crimea, and Donbas as evidence. But was this true imperialism or a reaction to Western encroachment?
Critics see Russia’s actions in Syria, Crimea, and Donbas as proof of imperial ambitions. But perhaps there’s an alternative explanation. Not every strong power must behave like an empire. Former U.S. President Donald Trump claimed he was a “man of peace,” promising to end “endless wars” and stop policing the world. While his rhetoric was inconsistent, his broader philosophy raised an essential question:
“Is it possible for powerful nations to avoid aggression and imperialism?”
The sad truth is, we don’t know — because no one has ever tried. For the last centuries, every rising power — from the U.S., Britain, Dutch and France to Imperial Russia and Japan — has pursued dominance. No rising power has tried to coexist peacefully. The logic is always the same: “They will attack us if we don’t attack them first.” But perhaps that logic is flawed.
The world remains locked in an endless cycle of reactive imperialism, where one power reacts to another, and everyone else pays the price. Syria is proof of this cycle in action. One regime change attempt sparks five interventions by competing powers. The war in Syria is not just a tragedy for Syrians but a symbol of the larger geopolitical disease that haunts humanity.
As Syria’s future hangs in the balance, one thing is certain: the rules of global power have changed. The era of Western dominance is over. No longer will one power dictate the future of the Middle East or the world. The new order is multipolar. It is a world where Russia, China, India, Turkey, and Iran all have their spheres of influence. In this world, the U.S. no longer calls the shots.
For decades, the West justified its actions with the language of “human rights,” “democracy,” and “freedom.” But behind this rhetoric lies the same imperial logic: control the oil, control the gas, and control the military bases. This logic is no different from what Russia, Turkey, or Iran are doing. The only difference is that the West calls it “humanitarian intervention,” while its rivals call it “protection of allies.”
Turkey and Russia have something in common: they were all historically marginalized by European powers, treated as second-class civilizations, and denied a seat at the table. Yet, in 2024, these same nations control Europe’s future. While Europe tries to free itself from Russian gas, it only becomes more dependent on Turkish pipelines and Qatari LNG. By removing Assad, they removed Russia’s influence in Syria — but only to hand Syria over to Turkey, a state that has been Europe’s historic nemesis.
Perhaps the Syrian war, like so many others, will serve as a reminder that “might makes right” is not a rule of nature but a choice. It is not preordained that strong powers must behave as empires. The real challenge for the future of global politics lies in discovering whether a non-aggression pact between great powers is possible, or whether history will simply continue to repeat itself.
Until that question is resolved, the world will remain locked in an endless cycle of reactive imperialism — where one power reacts to the other, and the rest of the world is forced to live with the consequences.
Be careful what you wish for.